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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




STEVEN J. KEARL, 
 












          NOS. 44565 & 44566 
 
          Bonner County Case Nos.  
          CR-2016-365 & 2016-1410 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Kearl failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with three years fixed, upon his 
guilty plea to lewd conduct with child under 16, and 10 years, with three years fixed, 
upon his guilty plea to possession of sexually exploitative material? 
 
 
Kearl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Kearl pled guilty to lewd conduct with child under 16 (44565) and to possession 
of sexually exploitative material (44566).  (R., pp.96-99, 226-29)  The district court 
imposed concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with three years fixed (44565), and 
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10 years, with three years fixed (44566).  (R., pp.96-99, 226-29.)  Kearl filed a timely 
notice of appeal in each case.  (R., pp.101-03, 231-33.)   
Kearl asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in light of his lack of criminal 
history, employment history, need for alcohol and sex offender treatment, and his 
purported remorse and acceptance of responsibility.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  The 
record supports the sentence imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give 
them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of 
society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the trial judge, this 
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
 3 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 
148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)). 
The maximum prison sentence for lewd conduct with child under 16 is life and for 
possession of sexually exploitative material is up to 10 years.  I.C. §§ 18-1508,               
-1507(3).  The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with 
three years fixed, for lewd conduct with child under 16, and 10 years, with three years 
fixed, for possession of sexually exploitative material, both of which fall within the 
statutory guidelines.  (R., pp. 96-99, 226-29.)  
Kearl’s claim that he has “no criminal history of any kind” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3 
(citing Tr., p.9, Ls.6-10)) is not entirely accurate.  While he has no prior convictions, it is 
undisputed that he sexually abused his daughter over a period of 10 years before she 
disclosed the molestation, thereby giving rise to the lewd conduct charge to which Kearl 
pled guilty in this case.  (PSI for CR-2016-1410, p.6.)  In any event, the district court 
specifically considered Kearl’s “lack of prior criminal history” as a mitigating factor in its 
sentencing determination.  (Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.9-12.)  The court was also well aware at 
the time of sentencing that Kearl expressed a desire for treatment, was remorseful and 
had a positive employment history.  (See PSI for CR-2016-1410, pp.7, 11-13; Sent. Tr., 
p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.8, p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.1, p.14, L.16 – p.15, L.9.)  That the court 
ultimately concluded none of these factors outweighed the need for a sentence that 
would achieve societal protection, deterrence, and punishment does not show the court 
abused its discretion.  At sentencing, the district court addressed the seriousness of the 
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offenses and the devastating impact Kearl’s actions had on the victim.  (Sent. Tr., p.15, 
L.22 – p.18, L.2 (Appendix A).)  The state submits that Kearl has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the 
sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  
(Appendix A.)   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kearl’s convictions and 
sentences. 
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Recovery for Tiffany and myself is 
predicated on the fact that we can overcome our 
adversities through treatment and s upport with 
understanding , that we are redeemable and sti l l of 
value . 
I have always been a person of few words . 
I would ask the Court for the chance to let my 
actions speak fervently and loudly, that I am an 
amenab l e candidate for change. 
THE COURT : Thank you, Mr. Kearl. 
For the record, any legal , factual or 
ethical reason not to impose the sentence? 
MS . JENSEN : No, Your Honor . We would ask 
the Court in all the factual instances, I guess, 
underlying t his case just with his legal history, he 
would qualify for a withheld judgment; and certainly 
ask the Court to take that into consideration as 
well. 
But no other equitable reasons to avoid 
sentencing , Your Honor. 
THE COURT : Thank you . 
Mr. Kea rl , there are four things that I ' m 
directed by statute to l ook at when I sentence. 
Number one is protection of society. 






























committing crimes like this . Number three is 
rehabilitation. Number four is retri bution or 
punish~ent . 
And I need to look at the nature of the 
offense, the aggravating and the mitigating factors , 
the impact on the victim, the nature of your 
credibil i t y , remorse, attitude , alcohol and drug use . 
And I have looked at all of those factors. 
Mitigating factors are lack of prior 
criminal history, the low LSI score. However , I 
don't know how to say it except t hat sex offenses are 
different. 
I have sentenced a number of people o n lewd 
and lascivious cases . And the vast majority have no 
prior criminal histor y and a low LS I score . Sex 
offenses , especially when they are within a family, 
they are hidden offenses. 
And typically sex offenders don ' t commit 
other crimes and they go unnoticed . And that's kind 
of the tragedy, that something like this can go on 
for years and years and without -- until it ' s finally 
discovered . 
In this case , this isn't l ike a crime where 
a person gets caught early or confesses or anyt hing . 































enough and safe enough, had some therapy, and then 
the victim is able to disclos e . 
I can't think of any other crime, except for 
a murder, that takes so much f~om a victim. And 
like Tiffany said in this case, when you take a 
person ' s trust and thei r innocence in childhood , you 
know that a father is the person that's supposed to 
protect their children . So, that's something -- when 
something like this happens -- just your basic 
foundation of the way life is supposed to work and 
who you can trust is completely shaken. 
And I have a lot of respect for Mr. Lombard 
as well , a nd I agree wi th Ms . Jensen that he has no 
hesitation in recommending prison . But I think a 
retained jurisdiction in this case just does not 
deal with the seriousness of the crime, the 
deterrent, the retribution, the protection factors . 
So, I try to find a sentence that I believe 
marries your lower risks with the seriousness of the 
crime. So I am going to impose a unified sentence of 
13 years , three years fixed, 10 years indeterminate. 
I am going to require that you spend som~ Lime in 
prison . 
The crime i s j ust too serious for you not to 






























responsibility, real i z i ng the fact you do that for 
your family and for the community. 
I will make the sentences on the two cases 
concurrent . I think the sentence is l i mited on 
sexual exploitation, is a ten year. 
So, a three and ten on the Land L c ase, 
three and seven on the sexual exploitation case. 
The sentences are concurrent . You will get 
credit for a ll the t ime you have served to date . I 
will impose court costs in each case . 
Given the length of the sentence , I won ' t 
impose fines . 
There may be a request - - Mr. Marshal l , I 
don ' t know if there will be any request for 
restitution or not . 
MR . MARSHALL : Probably not , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Mr . Kearl has been in custody 
well -- I note t he probabl e cause was found on 
January 17 o f 2016 . So , Mr. Kearl , Ms . J ensen , I do 
believe that is the t est imony tha t since that time --
I know he was in the hospi t al for a short period of 
time , I believe. 
MS. JENSEN : Mr . Kearl believes he was taken 
into custody on the 15th . 
THE COURT: All right , I will gi ve you 
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